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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the problems of measuring uneven wealth distribution in the bitcoin ecosystem. All existing bitcoin 
distribution models depend on the analysis of bitcoin wallets and bitcoin addresses. They are based on the Bitcoin Rich 
List. This approach is insufficient due to the inscrutable relationships between people owning bitcoin, bitcoin wallets, 
and bitcoin addresses. In this paper, we used the methods of comparative analysis resulted in graphics as represented 
by Lorentz and Lamé curves and distribution of the Gini coefficients and the Kolkata index. We identified empirical 
cumulative functions of wealth distribution and the number of addresses with positive balance during the bubble and 
after its explosion. Approximations of the distribution of ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ addresses have been obtained and compared 
with the other results from the cited literature. The general public views the equality of network members as synonymous 
with the equal distribution of wealth among them. Emerging financial bubbles, especially in the US financial markets, 
lead to an increase in income inequality. However, after a bubble explodes, the inequality falls to the initial level.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье рассматриваются проблемы измерения неравномерности распределения богатства в экосистеме биткоин. 
Все существующие модели распределения биткоин зависят от анализа биткоин-кошельков и биткоин-адресов. Они 
основаны на богатом списке биткоинов. Такого подхода недостаточно из-за непостижимых отношений между людь-
ми, владеющими биткоинами, биткоин-кошельками и  биткоин-адресами. В  работе нами использовались методы 
сравнительного анализа с графическим изображением результатов в виде кривых Лоренца, Ламе и распределения 
коэффициентов Джини и индекса Кольката. Авторы определили эмпирические кумулятивные функции распреде-
ления богатства и количества адресов с положительным балансом во время пузыря и после его взрыва. Получены 
аппроксимации распределения «бедных» и «богатых» адресов и сделано их сравнение с другими результатами, 
представленными в цитируемой литературе. Широкая общественность рассматривает равенство членов сети как 
синоним относительно равного распределения богатства между ними. Появление финансовых пузырей, в особенно-
сти на финансовых рынках США, приводит к увеличению неравенства доходов, но после краха пузыря неравенство 
падает до начального уровня.
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INTRODUCTION
The issues of inequality of wealth distribution in the 
Bitcoin ecosystem attracted the attention of some 
researchers [1–4]. ‘Cryptocurrencies’ are nothing 
else, but offering nothing for something that has 
any value. They are not money at all. It is some kind 
of a ‘valued’ financial claim, and nothing else. In the 
world of ‘cryptocurrencies’ are two main questions. 
The first question concerns the payment system and 
the underlying technology. The second one con-
cerns the money as such. The bitcoin ecosystem, as 
declared by Satoshi Nakamoto in his “white paper”, 
ought to be a peer-to-peer payment system with the 
central accounting book (ledger) maintained by the 
so-called miners as a chief accountant, and no inter-
mediaries. However, it is only digital technology with 
no means of payments. There exist payment systems 
(VISA, MasterCard, American Express, PayPal and 
others) using fiat money as a means of payments.
On the contrary, Nakamoto proposed to introduce 
proprietary means of payments —  bitcoin. It is assumed 
that the terms ‘bitcoin’ or ‘cryptocurrency’ create a 
mental image of a real currency. Moreover, the name 
bitcoin was also intended to create a mental image of 
money in circulation —  coins. The intention was to use 
bitcoins as a tool for purchasing goods and services, 
i. e. as a medium of exchange.
Our main theses as concerns the Bitcoin ecosystem 
are as follows:
It is a big redistributive pump.
It is a big speculative controlled chaos using price 
manipulations.
It is a means of wealth accumulation and increas-
ing inequality.
It is not a payment system, and the so-called ‘cryp-
tocurrency’ is not money.
It is the most appropriate place for money launder-
ing, buying drugs, and other illicit activities.
In the Bitcoin ecosystem, the only winner is a miner 
and several very clever tech-savvy.
The Bitcoin ecosystem cannot operate without par-
allel fiat money system.
The Bitcoin ecosystem, declared by Satoshi Naka-
moto as a new inflation-free money system, is nothing 
but a child’s play for adults.
Any so-called ‘cryptocurrency’ is the main threat to 
the social and financial inclusion of the less developed 
nations and communities.
Despite the difference and diversity of processes 
in socio-economic systems, the distribution of wealth 
and income among agents consistently demonstrates 
a surprising similarity for a strikingly broad class of 
systems [1–8].
We can observe that for ‘poor’ agents, the wealth 
distribution has an exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs 
form, and for ‘rich’ agents, ‘thick’ tails with Pareto 
power. It is well-known that the increase in inequal-
ity of wealth distribution in socio-economic systems 
leads to an increase in its social, economic and po-
litical instability.
Emerging digital forms of assets, rapid develop-
ment of the so-called ‘cryptocurrencies’, the growth 
of global telecommunications networks (including the 
internet) and the rise of innovative financial technolo-
gies (FinTech) make inequality in the digital economy 
extremely relevant.
In 2009, an anonymous author [9], known under a 
pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto, published a docu-
ment that marked the beginning of the development of 
the bitcoin peer-to-peer network using the replicated 
distributed database technology —  the blockchain 
technology. The advanced technology based on the 
asymmetric encryption eliminates the need to attract 
a financial intermediary for the payments between 
equal network participants.
The possibility of algorithmic support of trust be-
tween the participants of the bitcoin network without 
intermediaries and regulators has formed high expecta-
tions for the libertarian Internet community, especially 
in the United States.
The early triumphs of the bitcoin community in 
the fight against the state monetary monopoly and 
national financial regulators, the obvious simplicity of 
cross-border operations and the announced complete 
equality of all network participants also attracted the 
attention of the media to the new technology. The 
optimistic publications contributed to the inclusion 
of new network members and the efficiency growth of 
the peer-to-peer network, according to Metcalfe’s Law. 
Regarding the bitcoin network, the media develops the 
following expectations for the general public:
absolute equality of participants;
full disclosure of the system;
high probability of bitcoin ‘value’ growth in the 
future;
complete absence of state influence as a regulator 
of self-made ‘currencies’.
The general public views the equality of network 
members as a synonym for the relatively equal wealth 
distribution in the network. Emerging bubbles in the 
U.S. financial market lead to an increase in income 
inequality, but after a bubble explodes, the inequality 
falls to the initial level. However, the issue of the impact 
of the network bubble on the inequality of wealth of 
bitcoin network addresses remains open, and the pre-
sent work is devoted to the empirical study of this issue.
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NAKAMOTO’S SYSTEM OF PAYMENTS
According to Nakamoto, a solution to the double-
spending problem can be a peer-to-peer network 
electronic cash system that is a peer-to-peer distrib-
uted timestamp server to generate computational 
proof of the chronological order of transactions. Na-
kamoto has built his electronic cash system for com-
merce on the Internet free of trusted third parties. 
However, until now this system relies on financial 
institutions serving as trusted third parties for pro-
cessing electronic payments. In the current electronic 
payment systems, completely non-reversible transac-
tions are not possible.
Further, Nakamoto wrote, “What is needed is an 
electronic payment system based on cryptographic 
proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties 
to transact directly with each other without the need 
for a trusted third party” [9, p. 1]. Another issue is the 
high transaction costs for small random transactions 
and significant costs when there is a loss of ability to 
make irreversible payments for irreversible services. 
Moreover, a certain percentage of fraud should be rec-
ognized as inevitable.
In Nakamoto’s payment system are two key issues — 
honesty and incentive.
Honesty means equality, trust in code, decentrali-
sation, privacy, anonymity, consensus mechanism 
secured by a majority of nodes and lack of fraudulent 
activity. Simplified payment verification is reliable as 
long as honest nodes control the network.
The incentive is devoted to nodes to support the 
network. It provides a way to initial distribution of 
new ‘coins’ into circulation. The cost of the stimulus 
of the block containing the transaction is added to 
the transaction fee. This activity of network users is 
called mining. Mining is the act of creating bitcoins. 
It brings the miner new ‘coins’. The miners are always 
first possessors of new ‘coins’.
Mining is a contest to be first. Other contests, such 
as sports, are different because there are differences in 
skills among the participants. Here, it is the sufficient 
computing power under control that matters. It means, 
the more mining power a miner has, the higher the 
probability is to add more than one block. The only 
way is investing in hardware. However, this business is 
not for all. There is no skill in such search; the search 
can also be random in space.
On the other hand, ‘cryptocurrencies’ rely on com-
petitive mining to add new blockchains, thereby finalis-
ing transactions and creating new ‘coins’. For example, 
if there is a monopoly in mining bitcoins, then the 
bitcoin fails to achieve an open process. This does not 
rely on one trusted entity such as a private firm or a 
central bank. The monopolist must be trusted, or the 
Bitcoin ecosystem falls apart. If a miner or a collective 
group of miners (known as a pool) have 51 per cent of 
the total hashing power on the network, those miners 
would be able to exert significant power over the entire 
blockchain. It could be potentially devastating to the 
stability and reliability of the mined ‘cryptocurrency’.
PSYCHOLOGY OR ECONOMY?
Such a phenomenon as ‘cryptocurrencies’ ought to be 
analysed from the point of view of economy, sociol-
ogy, psychology, and psychiatry.
You can accumulate bitcoins and enjoy it. However, 
it is only miners who can accumulate bitcoins or those 
people who change something valuable for a miner to 
their bitcoins. Of course, it is preferable if ‘something 
valuable’ will be real (fiat) money. The death of the 
bitcoin payment system began when bitcoins were 
exchanged for fiat money. This is because there is no 
utility or opportunity to earn income in cryptocurrency. 
‘Investing’ in the so-called cryptocurrencies means no 
more speculation on price volatility. Therefore, manipu-
lating cryptocurrency prices is the most powerful means 
of increasing the ‘return from such ‘investments’ [10].
When we say “wealth”, we think how much fiat 
money should be received for the bitcoins. This is, of 
course, fiction as we are talking about hypothetical 
wealth. The so-called miners are generating “wealth’’ 
they put in circulation at their own discretion. In 
fact, the whole ‘payment’ system has become a big 
scam, which is a big redistributive pump. There is 
no more democracy, equality, consensus, and so on. 
‘Cryptocurrencies’ and other assets have evolved from 
the play money of enthusiasts into a tool for support-
ing criminal activity, a tool for speculation/gambling 
and tax evasion. It is now the world of whales, sharks, 
and sprats. They can be divided further into hoarders, 
traders, knackers, goofs, ideologists, criminals, and 
naive users. There are a few tech-savvy guys on top 
who are in control. Perhaps, Nouriel Roubini was right 
when he wrote: “It is time to start recognising their 
issuers’ utopian rhetoric for what it is: self-serving 
nonsense meant to separate credulous investors from 
their hard-earned savings” [11]. Indeed, all this activ-
ity can ultimately be viewed as supporting zero-sum 
activities.
WHAT IS MONEY?
To answer the question what money (nature and ori-
gins) is, we would need the entire issue of the journal 
or even write a separate book. Anyway, the concep-
tual approaches concerning money have dramatically 
different policy conclusions.
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For the orthodox theory, money spontaneously 
arises as a medium of exchange from the attempts of 
trading individuals to minimise the transaction costs 
of barter. The standard approach considers money to 
be neutral. They view money as a veil, a simple medium 
of exchange, which lubricates markets and derives 
its value from its metallic content. It is repeated in 
many theories and models. For example, in the Bewley 
model [12], the turnpike model of money elaborated by 
Townsend [13], the new monetarist view of money as 
a medium of exchange of Kiyotaki-Wright [14], Lagos-
Wright [15] and many others, which share the same 
perspective as Paul Samuelson [16]. For him, money 
is a bubble, as it is an intrinsically worthless asset, 
useful for executing trades between people who do not 
share a double-coincidence of wants.
There are also supporters of an unorthodox ap-
proach under various names: ‘chartalism’, ‘neohartal-
ism’, ‘tax-based money’, ‘modern money’ or ‘money 
as a creature the state’. The most discussed theory 
now is the Modern monetary theory (MMT) rooted in 
Chartalism [17–19].
It is clearly opposed to Marx’s view that money 
is analytically inconceivable without understanding 
commodity exchange. But who remembers Marx today?
Someone may think cryptocurrencies are the latest 
attempt to improve capitalism through the monetary 
reform. Indeed, attempts to reinvent money have a 
long history. Shortly speaking, to understand so-called 
‘cryptocurrencies’ one must understand money as such. 
Strictly speaking, one must follow some theory of mon-
ey and, consequently, have a theory of value as a basis. 
However, this topic goes far beyond our article [20, 21].
KEY REASONS FOR BITCOIN 
DISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY
Obviously, the main question in mined ‘cryptocur-
rency’ environment is how literally to metabolise 
electricity into money. However, no cryptocurrency 
is money. There is also not an account of externalities. 
According to Nakamoto, since a predetermined num-
ber of coins come into circulation, the incentive can 
completely switch to transaction fees and be com-
pletely inflation-free. Pipe dreams, and nothing else.
In essence, ‘cryptocurrencies’ can act as a medium 
of exchange and as a unit of account only within a par-
ticular virtual community. However, for the time being, 
the so-called cryptocurrencies cannot exist without 
fiat money systems. How can money be worth a lot of 
money? It means that bitcoins are not money if they 
are worth a lot of money. On the other hand, the large 
supply of goods and services can absorb a significant 
volume of ‘cryptocurrency’. It is not a case though. It 
seems that the hidden purpose of the ‘cryptocurrency’ 
movement is to decentralize state power regarding the 
existence of currencies. It means that cryptocurrencies 
are intended to be the antidote —  not the replica-
tion —  of modern currencies. This meets the dream of 
Friedrich von Hayek, who advocated that people have 
‘freedom of choice’ when it comes to what they use as 
money, that central banks should be abolished, and 
believed that governments should completely stop 
issuing money. People would be free to use whatever 
they chose as money, and free competition would show 
which money were the best.
It seems many supporters, and perhaps the crea-
tors, of cryptocurrencies were, and still, are, inspired 
by von Hayek’s views on money and monetary reform.
Manipulation with volatility 
and bubbles
The future of bitcoins seemed to be overwhelm-
ing. Many people worry that bitcoins were a Ponzi 
scheme, with Nakamoto its Bernie Madoff —  mining 
bitcoins when they were worthless and then waited 
for their value to increase. However, the most dedi-
cated bitcoin loyalists maintained their faith, not just 
in Nakamoto, but in the system he had built. There 
are also various third-party institutions, almost ex-
clusively non-banks, which have been active in de-
veloping and operating the currency and distributed 
ledger mechanisms.
The Nobel laureate Robert Schiller called the behav-
iour of the bitcoin network participants ‘epidemic of 
enthusiasm’ and ‘social movement’. He explained the 
rapid development of a bubble in the bitcoin network 
in December 2017, and the record ‘value’ of $ 19,499 
achieved by the excitement and emotions of the par-
ticipants with the complete absence of significant 
financial grounds.
It is hard not to think of bubbles in the context of 
cryptocurrencies, and especially bitcoin. Extensive 
literature on financial bubbles should be helpful in this 
regard. Cryptocurrency price fluctuations are common 
and lead to risk and uncertainty. It may be tempting to 
think that bitcoin prices can rise forever, since agents 
assume that prices will be even higher in the future. 
Using the methods of the theory of complex systems, 
which originated in physics, Chea and Fry [22] found 
that the prices of bitcoins contain a substantial specu-
lative bubble component (see also [23]). According to 
Robert Shiller, speculative bubbles are characterised 
by a peculiar “kind of fad or social epidemic following 
the principles of social psychology, imperfect news 
media and information channels” [24]. It means that 
the episodes of mass hysteria may still accompany even 
A. I. Il’inskii, Z. Mierzwa
ФИНАНСЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА / FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE   Т. 23,  № 2’201910
rational speculation. Given that most of the existing 
bitcoins are held in dormant accounts, bitcoin seems 
to behave more like a speculative asset than a currency. 
However, the fundamental value of bitcoin is zero.
Possible explanations for emerging bubbles include 
self-fulfilling expectations (rational bubble), mispric-
ing of fundamentals (intrinsic rational bubble) and 
endowment of irrelevant exogenous variables with 
asset pricing value (extrinsic rational bubble). The 
willingness of people involved in the transaction is 
the basis for treating ‘cryptocurrency’ as a valuable 
‘asset’. However, cryptocurrencies take on the quality 
of a Ponzi scheme if the value of the proposition de-
pends on attracting more and more users. Therefore, 
irrational bubbles can be developed when investors 
are driven by psychological factors not related to the 
asset’s fundamental value. Moreover, demand is related 
to mistrust of conventional stores of value. If people 
fear that excessive taxation, regulation, or social or 
financial instability places their assets at risk, they 
will increasingly turn to cryptocurrencies.
It is typical of a financial bubble that investors are 
buying ‘cryptocurrencies’ not to use in trading trans-
actions, but because they expect them to increase in 
value. Therefore, some agents start hoarding bitcoins 
in anticipation of price increase. There are two types of 
hoards —  voluntary and compulsory. It is called “hodles”.
Roubini has already said that bitcoin and other cryp-
tocurrencies represent “the mother of all bubbles”. Thus, 
when it comes to financial (economic) bubbles, there is 
no a greater authority than Robert Shiller. Shiller said 
that the “best example right now” of irrational exuber-
ance is bitcoin and “I’m interested in bitcoin as a sort of 
bubble. It doesn’t mean that it will disappear, that it’ll 
burst forever. It may be with us for a while”.
Moreover, we do not trust the market. Crypto mania 
represents more of a psychological experiment than a 
serious investment. Shiller called it “glamorous” and 
“another example of faddish human behaviour” [25].
Scams forever and for everybody
There are four groups of fans of ‘cryptocurrency’: de-
velopers; miners; high-skilled users; ‘brokers’, and 
goofs. In essence, ‘cryptocurrencies’ can act as a 
medium of exchange and as a unit of account only 
within a particular virtual community. However, until 
now, ‘cryptocurrencies’ cannot exist without a fiat 
money system. It means that they can “become a 
plaything for the naïve and gullible, or a weapon of 
financial mass destruction for political belligerents 
around the world” [26].
Roubini said even sharper: “Scammers, swindlers, 
charlatans, and carnival barkers (all conflicted insid-
ers) have tapped into clueless retail investors’ FOMO 
(“fear of missing out”), and taken them for a ride” [27]. 
Bitcoin’s only real use has been to facilitate illegal 
activities such as drug transactions, tax evasion, avoid-
ance of capital controls, or money laundering [28].
ILLUSION OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION
In financial markets, capitalization refers to the num-
ber of outstanding shares multiplied by the share 
price. As of March 15, 2019, we have 2110 ‘cryptocur-
rencies’, which are traded in 16,282 markets, and the 
total ‘market capitalization’ of all ‘cryptocurrencies’ 
is $ 136,103,501,136. The table below shows the mar-
ket capitalisation of three main ‘cryptocurrencies’.
Name Symbol
Market 
capitalisation
% of total 
market 
capitalisation
Bitcoin BTC $ 69137863084 50.8
Ethereum ETH $ 14209402572 10.4
XRP* XRP $ 13009406968 9.6
Total $ 96356672624 70.8
* Not mineable
As defined above, ‘market capitalization’ is noth-
ing more than fictitious capital. The main difference 
between issued shares (all shares of a corporation or 
financial asset) and ‘cryptocurrencies’ is that shares 
acquired and owned by them represent the ownership 
of the corporation by the person owning the shares. 
Consequently, they give them the right to receive divi-
dends and to vote at the general meeting of sharehold-
ers. However, if you cannot sell your ‘cryptocurrency’ 
for fiat money, you have the only opportunity to ‘earn’ 
more ‘crypto’ with the help of arbitrage, which is bought 
and sold at the same time for the purpose of making a 
profit from the price difference. It requires sufficient 
price volatility and is extremely time-consuming.
The so-called market capitalisation of ‘cryptocur-
rencies’ has to be corrected for lost, ‘dust’, and ‘hodlers’. 
As of November 2017, Chainalysis estimates that 3.79 
million bitcoins (based on a high estimate) and 2.78 
million (based on a low) have already been lost. It 
means that 17–23 per cent of the current bitcoins have 
been lost. These losses may result from an improperly 
directed transaction or the loss of a private key as a 
result of death or negligence. Some new studies confirm 
the findings of Chainalysis [29, 30].
Bitcoin uses an accounting structure called UTXO — 
Unspent Transaction Output. UTXOs are the internal 
ЦИФРОВЫЕ ФИНАНСОВЫЕ АКТИВЫ / DIGITAL FINANCIAL ASSETS
FINANCETP.FA.RU 11
mechanism used in many cryptocurrencies to rep-
resent sets of spendable ‘coins’. UTXO analysis does 
not give us the age / time when this bitcoin was first 
extracted, but when it was last used in a transaction. 
It means that all bitcoins have age and can be divided 
(clustered) according to their age. According to the 
Unchained Capital Blog, there is a common pattern 
after every rally in bitcoin’s price named a “HODL wave” 
[31]. Further, they examined the history and the future 
of dust: UTXOs of bitcoin that cost more to spend in 
fees than they hold [32, 33].
MODELLING DISTRIBUTION
Suppose that at a given time in the network are N 
addresses with a positive balance, which contain W 
bitcoins. We consider the statistical characteristics 
of the distribution of wealth W and the number of 
addresses with a positive balance N on the bitcoin x-
axis. Assume that the distribution of wealth W and 
the number of addresses N are defined by cumulative 
distribution functions G(x) and F(x). Then the value 
of wealth dW and the number of dN addresses in the 
dx interval are determined by the equations
   
( ) ( )dW WdG x Wg x dx= =   (1)
    ( ) ( )dN NdF x Nf x dx= = ,  (2)
where g(x) and f(x) are probability density functions of 
the distribution of W and N.
The relationship between the wealth volume dW 
and the number of addresses dN in the dx interval is 
determined by the value of bitcoin x and sets the ratio 
between the probability density function g(x) and f(x) 
in the form
         
( ) ( )Wf x dx xNg x dx=   (3)
              
( ) ( )Nf x xg x
W
= .  (4)
Taking the integral of equation (4) from 0 to ∞ we 
obtain
  
( )
0
.
W
g d
N
∞
ξ ξ ξ =∫   (5)
We use the Lorenz curve to estimate the inequality 
of wealth distribution by addresses with a positive bal-
ance. The cumulative share of addresses with positive 
balance z(x) and the cumulative share of wealth L(x) 
are calculated by formulas
     
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
1
 ,
x x
z x dN g d
N
= ξ = ξ ξ∫ ∫   (6)
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
0 0
0
1
x
x x g d
L x dW f d
W g d
∞
ξ ξ ξ
= ξ = ξ ξ =
ξ ξ ξ
∫
∫ ∫
∫
. (7)
Comparing equations (6)–(7) and equations (1)–(2) 
allows using cumulative distribution functions G(x) 
and F(x) to construct the Lorenz curve
      
( ) ( ),z x F x=   (8)
      
( ) ( )L x G x= .  (9)
The inequality of wealth distribution is defined by 
the Gini coefficient as
         
( ) ( )
0
1 2 .Gini F dG
∞
= − ξ ξ∫
 
 (10)
Another measure of inequality is the Kolkata index 
or k-index defined as k share of total addresses which 
possess (1 —  k) share of total wealth. [5]
      
( ) 1 .L k k= −   (11)
Geometrically, this is an intersection point of the 
Lorenz curve with the diagonal y = 1 —  x. For a wide 
class of socio-economic systems with high inequal-
ity, there is a relationship between these inequality 
indicators shown in [6].
      for all 0.79.Gini k Gini= >   (12)
To approximate the Lorentz curve in social systems 
with high inequality, it was proposed to use the curve 
Lamé or super-ellipse [7], which has the form
      ( )1 mmL z+ − = 1 for m < 1.  (13)
This ratio allows determining the index m to ap-
proximate the Lorenz curve by super-ellipse if the 
Kolkata index k is known according to the formula
               
( )
( )
ln 2
ln 1
m
k
= −
−
.  (14)
To determine the empirical cumulative density 
probability of wealth distribution and the number 
of addresses with a positive balance of bitcoins we 
used the data from website bitcoinprivacy.net for the 
moment of the developed cryptocurrency bubble (De-
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cember 2017) and the post-crisis state (June 2018) *. In 
December 2017, the price of a bitcoin reached the level 
of 19,290 USD/BTC, and in June 2018 it returned to 
the price range of 6,000–7,000 USD/BTC. With a clear 
assessment bubble, the main goal of cryptocurrencies 
has become a form of high-risk financial speculation. 
It ultimately diverts productive resources towards 
supporting the zero-sum game.
In Fig. 1 the cumulative probability densities of wealth 
F and the number of addresses G for the two specified 
periods are given. For comparison, the figure shows the 
Pareto distribution for rich addresses and logarithmically 
normal distributions for addresses with a positive balance.
The transition from the state of the cryptocurrency 
bubble to the post-crisis state and the overcoming of mass 
excitement did not affect the distribution of wealth in the 
system, but led to the emergence of a big number of new 
‘poor’ addresses. For rich addresses with a balance of more 
than 100 BTC, we observed a stable distribution of wealth, 
which is well described by the equation
( ) ( )0.0828ln 0.0431F x x= +  2 0.998.withR =  (15)
In this range, the probability density function of the 
distribution of the number of addresses and wealth are ex-
ponential ones, which indicates the presence of thick tails.
The intersection point of the curve (15) with the 
horizontal axis gives a parameter that conditionally 
divides the entire area into a range of ‘poor’ addresses 
(x < 0.595 BTC) and ‘rich’ addresses (x > 0.595 BTC). 
In the case of ‘poor’ addresses, their distribution is 
determined by the log-normal law.
At the same time, the excitement in the crypto-
currency market leads to the shift of the G curve to 
the left, which means a big number of addresses with 
a small and minimal balance.
The obtained results confirm the existence of both 
lognormal distributions for the ‘poor’ and exponential 
distribution for the ‘rich’ addresses in the system.
In Fig. 2 we present the Lorenz curves in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem during the cryptocurrency bubble and the post-
critical period. For comparison, we constructed Lamé’s 
approximation with m = 0.226 and the diagonal y = 1 –  x. 
A big change in the exchange rate of bitcoin has led to 
the relative change of the Gini coefficient of less than 3 
per cent.
Comparison of our inequality results in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem with the results of Paolo Tasca [8], shown 
in Fig. 3, demonstrates the high stability of the level 
of inequality in the Bitcoin ecosystem.
 
 
Fig. 1. Cumulative probability densities of wealth F 
of wealth and the number of addresses G for the two 
specified periods
Fig. 2. Lorenz curves and Lamé approximation 
distribution
Fig. 3. Comparative picture of inequality
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* After many long shutdowns, the administrator of this site 
decided to temporarily disable it.
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Table 1
Distribution of Addresses and Bitcoins
Bitcoin distribution (March 2019)
Balance Addresses
% 
Addresses
% Addresses
(cumulative)
Coins, BTC
% Coins 
(Total)
% Coins
(cumulative)
0–0.001 11,295,892 48.43 100 2,277 0.01 100
0.001–0.01 5,235,013 22.45 51.57 21,341 0.12 99.99
0.01–0.1 4,206,319 18.04 29.12 138,788 0.79 99.87
0.1–1 1,857,802 7.97 11.08 590,351 3.36 99.08
1–10 576,019 2.47 3.12 1,513,772 8.62 95.72
10–100 134,320 0.58 0.65 4,402,776 25.06 87.1
100–1,000 14,661 0.06 0.07 3,709,066 21.11 62.04
1,000–10,000 1,780 0.01 0.01 4,397,776 25.03 40.92
10,000–100,000 100 0.00 0.00 2,219,202 12.63 15.89
100,000–1,000,000 5 0.00 0.00 571,958 3.26 3.26
Total 23,321,911 17,567,307
Bitcoin distribution (September 2018)
Balance Addresses % Addresses
% Addresses
(cumulative)
Coins, BTC % Coins
% Coins
(cumulative)
0–0.001 10,986,131 49.14 100.00 2,277 0.01 100
0.001–0.01 4,973,608 22.24 50.86 20,243 0.12 99.99
0.01–0.1 3,922,873 17.55 28.62 125,146 0.72 99.87
0.1–1 1,746,074 7.81 11.07 566,352 3.28 99.15
1–10 581,157 2.6 3.26 1,524,614 8.82 95.87
10–100 132,404 0.59 0.67 4,373,696 25.31 87.05
100–1,000 14,750 0.066 0.07 3,700,301 21.41 61.74
1,000–10,000 1,528 0.0068 0.01 3,366,888 19.48 40.32
10,000–100,000 123 0.0000055 0.00 3,157,831 18.27 20.84
100,000–1,000,000 3 0.0000000 0.00 443,396 2.57 2.57
Total 22,358,651 17,280,744
Bitcoin distribution (September 2017)
Balance Addresses
% 
Addresses
% Addresses
(cumulative)
Coins, BTC % Coins
% Coins
(cumulative)
0–0.001 10,620,060 48.93 100.00 2,108 0.01 100
0.001–0.01 4,890,033 22.53 51.07 20,471 0.12 99.99
0.01–0.1 3,822,343 17.61 28.54 122,423 0.73 99.87
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CONCLUSIONS
All cryptocurrency schemes are nothing more than 
computer games designed for those who have a lot 
of time or a lot of real money. Since, to be richer you 
have to be rich. This is due to the fact that people tend 
to get rich quick. According to Roubini’s apt defini-
tion, “bitcoin is a slow energy-inefficient dinosaur”. 
All so-called cryptocurrencies are not payment sys-
tems. They are also not money. Given the scale of the 
movement, it does not deserve the attention it initially 
received. However, we should consider what Robert 
Shiller called “go viral”. Even a new invention, the so-
called stable coins, which are considered as a less risky 
entry into the world of ‘cryptocurrency’, is not pro-
tected from risky activities. They are also subject to 
actions such as “pump and dump” price manipulation 
schemes. In this world, there are not enough guaran-
tees of equality and fairness. Here we can observe the 
growth mechanism of inequality in its pure form. And 
such research should be continued in the future.
Balance Addresses
% 
Addresses
% Addresses
(cumulative)
Coins, BTC % Coins
% Coins
(cumulative)
0.1–1 1,673,101 7.71 10.93 539,890 3.20 99.14
1–10 549,847 2.53 3.22 1,451,329 8.60 95.94
10–100 130,962 0.6 0.68 4,334,128 25.69 87.34
100–1,000 15,677 0.07 0.08 3,692,242 21.88 61.65
1,000–10,000 1,529 0.01 0.01 3,326,271 19.72 39.77
10,000–100,000 112 0.00 0,00 2,948,970 17.48 20.05
100,000–1,000,000 3 0.00 0,00 433,865 2.57 2.57
Total 21,703,667 16,871,697
Bitcoin distribution (September 2016)
Balance Addresses % Addresses
% Addresses
(cumulative)
Coins, BTC % Coins
% Coins
(cumulative)
0–0.001 7,164,625 67.86 100 5,458 0.03 100.00
0.001–0.01 1,765,595 16.72 32.08 30,084 0.19 99.96
0.01–0.1 724,696 6.86 15.36 89,929 0.57 99.77
0.1–1 591,370 5.60 8.50 457,334 2.88 99.20
1–10 202,350 1.92 2.90 1,136,689 7.16 96.32
10–100 102,904 0.97 0.98 5,375,940 33.87 89.16
100–1,000 5,756 0.06 0.1 3,950,850 24.89 55.29
1,000–10,000 451 0.004 0.004 2,609,991 16.45 30.40
10,000–100,000 45 0.000 0.00 2,079,374 13.10 13.95
100,000–1,000,000 1 0.000 0.00 134,995 0.85 0.85
Total 10,557,793 15,870,644
Aggregate Comparison of Main Tendencies
Addresses for range 0–0.1 Coins for range 0–0.1 as% of total Coins for range 1,000–1,000,000
2019 = 88.92%
2018 = 88.93%
2017 = 89.07%
2016 = 91.44%
2019 = 0.94
2018 = 0.85
2017 = 0.86
2016 = 0.78
2019 = 40.92
2018 = 40.32
2017 = 39.77
2016 = 30.40
End of Table 1
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